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SUPPORTING INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC OWNERSHIP 
A HOW TO NOTE FOR DONORS1 
 
Rosalind Eyben 
1. Summary 
Even in stable democracies broad-based, inclusive policy ownership is rare.  It is even 
more unlikely in country contexts that are more institutionally and socially complex and 
experiencing rapid economic and social change.   With an aid effectiveness agenda that 
promotes ownership and accountability in partner countries this means looking critically 
at how "ownership" is constructed in the policy process and the role of donors in 
support. Policy is never just technical. It involves politics and power.  Donors have to 
understand how policy works in practice (as distinct from theory) in any particular 
country context. It requires undertaking power analyses with themselves factored in - as 
organisations and individuals - who can make a positive or negative contribution.  They 
need to be self-aware to avoid disempowering others in the policy process. At the same 
time, they should engage with a wide and diverse group of policy actors in state, civil 
society and the private sector and whenever possible support debate and locally driven 
independent research. While taking a back seat in providing policy advice, they should 
seek out and support pro-poor reform policy networks, particularly those straddling 
state-society divisions.  Supporting the realisation of human rights for all and facilitating 
poor people’s empowerment in all the programmes they support are two key measures 
that donors can employ for long term strengthening of inclusive and democratic country 
ownership. 
 
Following a brief discussion of context and challenges, this ‘how to note’ is drafted in 
the form of some ‘frequently (donor) asked questions”: 
 How can donors support pro-poor policy change? 
 Why do donors have to do power analyses? 
 How can donors avoid interfering politically? 
 With whom should donors engage? 
 How should donors work with civil society for inclusive and democratic 
ownership? 
 Is supporting the realisation of human rights a violation of inclusive country 
ownership? 
 How can donors facilitate poor people’s empowerment for more inclusive and 
democratic ownership? 
 
                                               
1
 This Note was commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development Co-operation and a 
 previous draft was presented in October 2010 at a meeting of Cluster A of the OECD/DAC Working Party 
on Aid Effectiveness, chaired by Philippe Besson to whom I am very grateful for his guidance and 
encouragement. Thanks also to my colleague Jeremy Holland for his feedback.  
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2. Background: emerging trends in donor thinking 
Globalisation means that no country ‘is an island unto itself’. Full autonomy is neither 
feasible nor desirable.  However, countries heavily dependent on aid have less 
autonomy than others.  Their policy choices and capacities for action are constrained by 
the views and wishes of international development institutions.  Ideological dependency 
too often accompanies financial aid.    That donor driven policies do not work was the 
origin of the Paris Declaration’s concept of ‘ownership’.  However, five years later, aid 
recipient countries are still subject to donor driven policies and donors are still 
wondering what to do about it.  The problems that first led to the ownership agenda 
have not gone away (Booth 2008a). Even when aid modalities may have changed, these 
have not necessarily solved the problem; for example, there is evidence from 
Mozambique that General Budget Support has made donors more interfering (De 
Renzio and Hanlon 2007).   
 
 Furthermore, since Paris there has been a strong and recent donor trend to undermine 
the ownership agenda. The economic and financial crisis is placing donor governments 
under increasing pressure to demonstrate to their domestic constituencies that every 
Euro in the aid budget is spent efficiently and effectively.  Rather than releasing control, 
the logic of this argument leads to donors seeking ever greater influence.  As one donor 
representative in Mali put it, ‘What donors want is a structure that can start working 
quickly, someone to talk to, someone who will answer the phone, answer their 
questions and follow up their programs - not an administration that would be efficient 
for and accountable to the population’ (Bergameschi 2007:13).   Thus, although the 
intention of  country ownership was to reverse the process by which recipient 
governments were more formally accountable to their donors than to their own citizens 
(Horner and Power 2009), this is being undermined by an equally strong (or stronger) 
imperative to demonstrate to their own citizens that they are in control of how the 
money is spent: “The privilege of a ring-fenced budget demands more not less scrutiny 
so that we can look the hard-pressed taxpayer in the eye, so that we can reassure them 
they are getting 100p of value for every pound spent on development” 2 
 
Nevertheless, there are promising signs that development aid is in practice making 
progress with the ownership agenda.  
 
Firstly, what was initially conceived in the Paris Declaration as ownership by the 
executive branch of government has shifted to a recognition of the role of formal 
representative institutions – parliament and regional and local government 
assemblies – as well as to an appreciation that ‘civil society’ participation in 
policy processes goes beyond the involvement of donor-friendly NGOs.  
 
                                               
2
 UK Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell quoted in the Daily Telegraph 4 July 2010  
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Secondly, just as the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD/DAC 2008) extended the 
notion of country ownership beyond the executive branch of government, so 
also did discussions on the road to Accra highlight the notion of ‘development 
effectiveness’ – that aid is only effective if it achieves good development results 
in terms of the sustainable reduction of poverty, gender equality and the 
realisation of human rights (Better Aid 2010).  Re- connecting ‘aid effectiveness’ 
with the purposes of aid links the ownership agenda to donor approaches that 
are grounded in the principles of participation, accountability and transparency 
(Horner and Power 2009). Increasing emphasis on strengthening and deepening 
democratic institutions reflects donor awareness that the most they can aspire 
to support is not broad-based ownership of specific policies such as PRSPs but 
rather to help states become both more effective and more accountable to all 
their citizens through strengthening those institutional arrangements for policy-
making and implementation that have broad-based legitimacy. 
 
Thirdly, a growing body of research evidence on power and policy processes is 
beginning to inform our understanding of aid relations, bringing the concept of 
broad-based ownership back into the real world of messy politics. When donors 
sought recipient country ownership of Poverty Reduction Strategies, they forgot 
that such ownership would be unlikely in their own countries, let alone in 
countries with high levels of economic inequality and political exclusion (Faust 
2010).  It is a very rare occurrence when all the citizens of a country are in 
agreement with their government’s policies. If donors want to promote 
democratic country ownership, they must recognise that political contest 
(including riots and demonstrations) and ideological disagreement are the 
benchmark of a working democracy.   
 
These are three encouraging signs that the ownership agenda is connecting at one and 
the same time with both the ambition of the Millennium Development Goals and with 
the real world of aid. This note is preliminary guide to what donors need to do more of 
to sustain and strengthen their support to inclusive and democratic ownership in 
countries to which they are providing aid.  It is couched in terms of answers to the 
questions likely to be prompted in response to the emerging trends in the ownership 
agenda that have just been discussed.  
 
3. Frequently Asked Questions 
3.1       How can donors support pro-poor policy change? 3 
Think and act politically about policy 
‘Country ownership’ was a response to concerns that donors were diagnosing problems 
and proposing policy solutions in aid recipient countries, potentially undermining 
                                               
3
 This section draws on Booth et al 2008, Unsworth 2010, Eyben 2008, UNRISD 2010, Menocal et al. 2007  
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democratic governance in the countries concerned and making governments in aid 
recipient countries more accountable to donors than to their own citizens. However, the 
manner in which donor agencies have until now tended to conceptualise policy has 
influenced how they have engaged with ‘ownership. Policy is understood as a response 
to an objectively real problem the existence and nature of which is judged as 
independent from the political position of those making the observation. Policy is 
understood as technical – a kind of testable hypothesis in relation to a publicly 
recognised problem – if X, then Y.  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research into how policy actually works in practice in countries with democratic regimes 
indicates that while policy can benefit from evidence and technical know-how, politics 
tend to over-ride technical advice, leading to policy responses of informed improvisation 
rather than strategic planning.  The national development strategies that donors 
advocate for aid recipient countries have long since been recognised as of little value 
back home in their own countries.  
 
 Understanding how policy works in 
practice in any particular country is a 
first step to moving away from a 
technocratic approach.  Various 
versions of an analytical framework 
are available (e.g. Keeley & Scoones 
2003, McGee 2004; Booth 2008). 
One of these (Eyben 2008) explains 
the policy process as a power 
struggle in which people (actors) 
working within institutional rules of 
the game, draw on current ways in 
which we interpret our world 
(discourses) shape policy decisions.  
Policy change - or successful 
resistance to change- occurs through 
networks of people that are 
Key Quote 
“UNRISD research suggests that countries that are 
dependent on multilateral financial institutions show 
high levels of policy capture by these institutions. Those 
with a longer history of democracy in which policy 
making reflects compromises between politicians and 
citizens have pursued more heterodox policies.”  
UNRISD 2010 p.287 
 
Political 
Actors 
 
 
Institutions 
 
Discourses 
 
Policy 
Networks 
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operating within the constraints and opportunities offered by the institutional and 
discourse environment. This framework allows donors to explore where and how policy 
networks are operating and, identify which ones they wish to support.  
 
A study of donor efforts to support health sector reform In Uganda and Tanzania 
concluded that donors could have done more to establish creative alliances among pro-
poor reformers in the ministry of health and civil society groups There was a reluctance 
among donor staff to undertake this kind of approach because of how they interpreted 
the principle of country ‘leaving donors to alternate between meekly accepting 
‘government’ inadequacies and pulling out/cutting back funding, as opposed to working 
with like-minded groups within (and outside) government departments to change the 
direction of government travel’ (Booth et al. 2008:16). On the contrary, in Peru DFID 
identified the importance of such policy networks for reforming the health sector, not 
only by providing them with seed-funding but also helping them broaden their appeal 
through adopting the discourse of a rights-based approach to health (Wilson 2005). 
 
The policy process is always contested and the outcome often unpredictable. Hence a 
possible donor approach would be to develop long-term and consistent relations with 
recipient organisations and networks (including those within governments) which are 
pursuing a change agenda more or less compatible with the donor’s own values and 
mission.  Rather than aiming to achieve a pre-determined specific real-world change in 
which the recipient organisation is treated as an instrument for that change, the focus 
of donor effort would be to support reformers’ own efforts in what may be a rapidly 
changing policy environment. DFID in Bolivia undertook such an approach in supporting 
for four to five years an apex organisation – the Comité Enlacé – in its efforts to 
represent the views and perspectives of its member associations of self-employed 
workers during a turbulent political period with a frequently shifting agenda. 
 
3.2 Why do donors have to do power analyses?4 
If donors ignore power they risk helping sustain rather than transform the institutional 
arrangements that keep people poor 
Today a number of donors are incorporating power analyses both into their diagnostic work and 
their governance assessments for informing programming and policy dialogue. However, 
because such analyses take donors out of their ‘technical’ comfort zone, there may be an 
institutional resistance to integrate such diagnoses into agencies’ day-to-day business. However, 
when the political contradictions and challenges in the aid relationship are ‘sanitised out’ in 
official documentation and reports, there is a high risk of donors forgetting the actual reality in 
which they are seeking to achieve good development results. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4
 This section draws on OECD/DAC 2008, Bayart 2000, Tadros 2010, www.powercube/net 
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There are many ways of analysing how power works and shapes who is involved in or 
excluded from policy making.5 Here is one possible framework particularly useful in 
support of inclusive and democratic ownership: 
 
 Visible power is manifest through the formal institutional arrangements for 
policy making and implementation, such as the civil service, the legislature, local 
government etc; certain policy actors, such as Ministers and parliamentarians 
are visibly powerful; 
 Informal power is less visible – it is hidden to many observers but nevertheless 
shapes the policy agenda ‘behind the façade’; certain institutions and policy 
actors, such as the army or business elites may be very influential although not 
part of the formal procedural arrangements; donors are often influential in this 
way; 
 Invisible power is at work through people’s internalisation of norms and beliefs 
about how the world should be and it can invisibly shape policy choices; invisible 
power is challenged through processes of empowerment when individuals and 
groups are able to imagine their world differently and to realise successfully that 
vision by changing the relations of power that have been keeping them in 
conditions of poverty or marginalisation.    
 
If donors focus only changing arrangements in relation to the first kind of power, they 
may find that hoped for outcomes in terms of more inclusive ownership fail to realize. 
For example, the increase in numbers of women in parliament in many countries has 
not automatically led to gender equality concerns becoming a more central policy issue 
                                               
5 ‘Political economy analyses’ are a version of power analyses that ‘look at the distribution of power and wealth 
between groups and individuals’ (OECD GOVNET website) An increasing number of donors have been undertaking 
such studies but in 2005 it was noted that there were significant differences in focus. For example Sida was interested 
in human rights, democracy and poverty reduction; the World Bank on formal public institutions and informal 
practices within these and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs on state stability (Dahl-Østergaard et al 2005). 
For different kinds of power analysis see www.powercube/net 
 
Key Quote 
“Common approaches to citizen engagement such as the 
PRSP process and the plethora of “citizen summits” and 
“listening sessions” emphasize bringing everyone to the 
table as ‘stakeholders,’ but fail to recognize that 
underlying power dynamics between conflicting interests 
have a huge impact on people’s capacity to participate 
and influence outcomes. All stakeholders are not equal, 
yet they are often treated as such, while agendas and 
parameters of discussion are defined in ways that leave 
out crucial issues”. 
Just Associates 2006 
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(Tadros 2010). Nor does the visible presence of women’s rights organisations necessarily 
result in any major policy shift unless informal and invisible power are recognised and 
addressed. In Uganda, for instance, donors supported women’s NGOs struggling to 
change the policy on land reform to make it more gender equitable. Wishing to 
conciliate the donors, the government appeared receptive to the NGO demands but 
processes of informal co-optation and the invisible power that led to many women 
leaders fearing to challenge the patriarchal status quo resulted in a dilution of the 
NGOs’ demands and a failure to shift the inequitable status quo (Nabacwa 2010). 
 
3.3  How can donors avoid interfering politically?6 
They can’t....... Donors are political actors 
Good donor practice requires informed decisions based on careful contextual analysis 
that importantly includes the effect of donors’ own activities and presence on this 
context. However, for many aid agency staff the principle of country ownership implies 
they should not interfere with local politics. This is why donors are often invisible in 
donor-funded power analyses. But even if donors decide to limit their role to the 
provision of objective technical advice, to whom should that advice be provided and for 
what end?  Which policy networks are likely to make the most use of such advice and 
why? To act ‘technically’ in a politically complex context is likely to make donors pawns 
of the more powerful vested interests and therefore by default makes them, albeit, 
naïve, and political actors. In Bolivia, for example, donors sought to establish a civil 
society fund as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy without appreciating they were 
being manipulated in a conflict between secular and clerical factions within the ruling 
elite (Eyben 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Donor staff exercise power every day through how they relate to others.  They may 
impose their own point of view, ignoring or dismissing as irrelevant other ways of 
understanding and of tackling problems. Those proposing alternatives feel 
disempowered and will drop out of the conversation, including at donor-sponsored 
workshop spaces where power inequalities can be all too evident - but also can be 
                                               
6
 This section draws on Booth et al 2008, Eyben 2003 
Key Quote 
The lessons learnt from my experience, as a member of the 
donor community in promoting accountability in Bolivia ... 
suggest the need for an explicit recognition that we are 
political actors and that donor staff need support and training 
to help them perform more effectively as such.  This means 
they need to be as effective in managing relationships as they 
are in managing money. 
Eyben 2003: 25 
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successfully challenged. Supporting inclusive ownership requires donor staff developing 
self-awareness of how power operates in their relationship with people in the country 
where they are working. The organisational and individual critical self-reflection that this 
demands delivers benefits for donors as well as for those they work with. Donors too 
will learn to think differently, imagine new possibilities and debate alternative choices. 
 
3.4 With whom should donors engage?7 
With diverse groups of policy actors in state, political parties, the private sector and 
civil society 
The term ‘development diplomacy’ encourages donor staff to engage with as wide as 
possible range of policy actors, not only to learn about the many different perspectives 
and diagnoses of a country’s problems and policy opportunities but also to play a helpful 
role in facilitating the airing of debates, including financing independent think tanks that 
can provide research-based evidence to add substance to these debates.   
 
General or sector budget support can play a potentially important role in encouraging 
broad-based ownership of policy reform both in their own policy dialogue with 
governments and through facilitating civil society access to policy –making.  In many 
cases, governments’ commitment to good development results means that such 
dialogue is primarily about the choice of means rather than the principle itself.   These 
are debates that should involve not only government officials, parliamentarians and civil 
society policy networks but also seek to capture the views and experiences of those 
living in poverty. Thus, donors can play a useful role in helping make such debates an 
empowering rather than disempowering and exclusionary process for poor and 
marginalised people. However, donors should avoid playing too big a part themselves in 
such debates.  To this end, donors need to avoid imposing a single harmonized analysis 
of the country’s major problems of poverty, the environment or growth.  These are 
complex problems subject to multiple diagnoses and solutions and broad-based country 
ownership of the process of solving such problems is diminished if donors insist on a 
single diagnosis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like venture capitalists, donors can simultaneously finance two different approaches to 
solving a problem. DFID and Sida in Bolivia supported two separate initiatives in support 
                                               
7
 This section draws on Unsworth 2009, Eyben 2008 UNRISD 2010 
Key Quote 
Donors would see their role not as experts 
bringing solutions, nor as politically neutral 
‘partners’, but as convenors, facilitators and 
politically aware contributors to serious debate. 
 
  Unsworth 2009, p.891  
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to people’s right to identity. One was through financing a civil society consortium via the 
intermediary of an international NGO; the other was to finance the National Election 
Commission via UNDP. These initiatives each worked relatively well on their own terms. 
The donors were facilitating variously-positioned actors to tackle the problem according 
to their different diagnoses and consequent purposes, and thus supporting a variety of 
different kinds of actions and projects. 
 
Aid agencies should not force people into partnerships but they can provide neutral 
spaces people can meet without any commitment other than to communicate with each 
other for the purpose of learning. This should be understood as a sufficient and entirely 
satisfactory output without any requirement for a consensual document or agreed plan 
of the way forward. 
3.5 How should donors work with civil society for inclusive and democratic 
ownership 8 
By recognising that states and societies help build each other, work with policy actors 
in state and civil society prepared for mutual engagement.  
 
Formal categories of nation-state and civil society may obscure rather than illuminate 
contextually specific and historically generated social and political practices and 
relationships and permeable institutional boundaries across which policy networks 
bargain for or resist policy change.    
 
Donors can support such bargaining by, for example encouraging a broad-based and 
inclusive tax regime that engages taxpayer-citizens in politics.  This concerns a process 
of ‘constructive contestation’ (Pritchett 2010) in which citizens become aware that they 
are taxpayers and organise themselves to make demands on government, while both 
sides must be in a position to reach an inclusive tax.  At the same time, donors need to 
recognize that not all groups can be incorporated into such a bargaining regime. 
Inclusive ownership can occur through social movements that are contesting established 
values and structural power relations and have the clout to exert pressure for change 
from a more radical position (UNRISD 2010).  Direct donor support of a social movement 
may put at risk its legitimacy and ways of working (OECD/DAC 2011 forthcoming) but 
donors can support institutions - such as human rights commissions - that keep open 
the space for such movements. 
 
Strengthening civil society is not always a route to inclusive ownership, as it depends on 
the context and on who is involved. Furthermore, donor enthusiasm for civil society can 
undermine state capacity, for example when donor-financed NGOs hire the most 
capable state officials. Donors’ encouragement of civil society without considering the 
capacity of the state to negotiate and respond can lead to demand overload.  
                                               
8
 This section draws on Giffen & Judge Benequista et al 2010 and Unsworth & Moore 2010.  
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Donors have a responsibility to ensure they relate with a broad range of civil society 
organisations from different perspectives and geographical bases. A common failure of donors 
has been to engage only with ‘user-friendly civil society’, while representatives of the more 
excluded sections of the population, who are less used – and possibly less willing - to meeting 
with educated foreigners are ignored. Donor interest in harmonisation can result in them all 
supporting the same relatively small group of civil society actors and reduce inclusiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the same donors must avoid perceiving state and civil society as binaries in 
opposition to each other and missing opportunities to support networks and 
organisations that are straddling the divide. Donors can help by supporting those 
working across the state /society borders and brokering connections.  This can be more 
effective than programmes that focus narrowly on either governance reform or civil-
society strengthening.  A study from Mexico looked at how reformers in the federal 
government (with World Bank and others’ support) facilitated policy change through 
creating regional economic development councils with elected representatives of 
indigenous producer organisations. This success depended heavily on the presence of a 
faction within the state institution prepared to go into partnership with autonomous 
social organisations. The study concludes that pro-poor change occurs when there are 
coalitions between state and society actors who share a common reform agenda and 
apply simultaneous top-down and bottom-up pressure to neutralise resistance from 
established elites (Fox 2004).    
 
3.6 Is supporting the realisation of human rights a violation of inclusive country 
ownership?9 
No, support to human rights for all helps strengthen such ownership. 
While donors have to avoid seeking to impose the policies that they prefer – thus 
undermining domestic policy processes of bargaining and consensus – this should not 
lead them to supporting a government that seriously disrespects human rights.  Donors 
                                               
9
 This section  draws on Foresti et al 2006 and Benequista et al 2010 
Key Quote 
Our research strongly suggests that strategies are needed 
which focus on the interaction between institutions and 
citizens – that is, on the relationships between states and 
societies – in constructing and implementing development 
policy. In certain circumstances, citizen engagement with the 
state can help to confer legitimacy, demand accountability, 
influence policies, counter elite capture of resources and 
implement effective services. Putting citizens at the centre, as 
members of states and societies, is critical for moving beyond 
the traditional state–civil society divide that has characterised 
much donor funding and policy. 
 Benequista et al 2010 p. 3 
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therefore have to work for a careful balance between supporting these domestic 
processes on the one hand and human rights conventions on the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human rights can contribute to the implementation of the ownership principle because 
it leads to citizenship based ownership. Citizens and their representative organisations 
are placed at the centre of policy making. Their knowledge, voices, and mobilisation 
make democratic and inclusive ownership a reality.  Citizenship strengthening leads to 
better informed people who can understand their rights and are able to engage 
constructively and effectively in claim-making, collective action, governance and 
political processes. 
 
Human rights conventions also provide guidance on how donors can help put the 
ownership principle into practice through support to state and civil society capacity. 
Donors can provide support to strengthen citizenship rights and enable marginalised 
and excluded citizens to have a greater voice in governance (OECD/DAC 2006).    
 
3.7 How can donors facilitate poor people’s empowerment for more inclusive and 
democratic ownership?10 
In addition to specific support to political empowerment, all programmes and services 
can be designed for empowerment multiplier effects  
Political empowerment is about people’s capacity to influence policy, make demands 
and call to account the state institutions that impact upon their lives. When people in 
poverty are unable to exert influence, states are unlikely to create enabling 
environments for good development results. Political empowerment occurs in the 
complex, ever-shifting and blurred boundaries of state-society relations.  Poor people’s 
empowerment through grass roots organisations and popular participation is often 
insufficient for changing the historical relations of inequality and exclusion that limit the 
state’s capacity to create an enabling environment for pro-poor growth. Subordinated 
                                               
10
 This section draws on the author’s draft of a forthcoming DAC Policy Guidance Note on empowerment and pro-
poor growth 
Key Quote 
Aid is only effective if it achieves good development 
results and good development results are not 
possible if gender inequalities persist, environmental 
damage is accepted or human rights are abused. 
 
Mary Robinson 
 OECD/DAC Conference in Dublin 2008 
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groups need to be brought into political processes through a combination of 
representative and deliberative institutions.   
 
Examples of the latter include health councils in Brazil and participatory planning in 
Uganda, where it is mandatory for districts to channel funds further down to counties, 
giving greater voice to ordinary citizens than if they were engaging at the district level. 
Involving citizens in making decisions about the management of public resources and 
institutions - what has been termed ‘co-governance’ - is an effective way of 
strengthening accountability. Even so, power relations may prevent many people from 
speaking their minds, even if they attend the meetings organised specifically for that 
purpose. In these circumstances people may first need to strengthen and learn to 
amplify their voices within more informal and familiar community settings. 
 
In all the programmes and projects that donors finance they can check whether these 
can be designed to have a broader empowering effect as well as achieving the 
programme’s specific goals. For example, micro-finance can be empowering if attention 
is paid to the formation and functioning of micro-credit groups as spaces for members  
to articulate their needs and interests, for participatory learning and for collective action 
to challenge the status quo (Mayoux 2000). 
 
 
 
Attention to the ‘how’ of empowerment in addition to the ‘what’ of the technical 
objectives brings a number of advantages: 
 
 It can lead to a higher uptake of the services on offer – children’s school 
attendance increases and women make more use of birthing centres; 
Key Quote 
 “The landless in this locality elected me. When I was 
elected I tried best to serve their interests. I was very shy 
before I joined this organisation. I couldn’t talk, was always 
afraid….I had never met any policeman. And now when the 
police arrest somebody, I myself go to the police station… I 
ask them why a working man has been arrested. I get them 
freed…. I know who is a criminal and who is a day labourer 
here. …. The rich have affinity with the rich…. We couldn’t 
protest if they beat our children. We always worked in their 
house. They take us as their servant…. We want a society 
where there is equality. There should be no discrimination 
between rich and poor. My organisation is mobilising for 
that society”.  
 
From Mossamat Jomila Khatun’s story as told to Naila 
Kabeer  (Eyben et al 2008) 
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 When the project is designed to give people a voice in how a service is managed, 
it is more likely to be delivered efficiently and effectively; 
 It may introduce shifts in power relations without being labelled an 
‘empowerment’ project, which may seem threatening to those in authority. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
This note has emphasized the importance that donors understand how policy works in 
practice and their need to be aware that they will be interfering politically. They should 
facilitate in-country debate and encourage pro poor reform networks of policy actors. 
Supporting the realisation of human rights for all and facilitating poor people’s 
empowerment in all the programmes they support are two key measures that donors 
can employ for long term strengthening of inclusive ownership. In so doing, donors need 
to play a more nuanced and genuinely supportive role. This indicates the importance of 
recruiting, training and retaining staff able to work comfortably and sensitively with 
ambiguity, paradox and unanticipated outcomes, with a high degree of political acumen, 
sensitivity to context and strong relationship skills. 
 
 There are very rarely quick wins for donors and past gains can rapidly unravel.  Donor 
agencies cannot ‘deliver’ policy effectiveness in the countries they are seeking to help.    
This highlights the need for donors to consider issues of attribution and contribution 
when measuring their effectiveness in supporting pro-poor policy outcomes in aid 
recipient countries. A one-sided emphasis on ‘delivering and reporting results’ for 
taxpayers in donor countries can put at risk their support to strengthening domestic 
accountability in partner countries. 
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